While reading Nussbaum's Humans and Other Animals, I was reminded of a response I once read to another of Nussbaum's arguments. The response was written by Peter Singer, a philosopher widely appreciated for his contributions to the animal liberation movement, and addressed an argument made by Nussbaum for the ethical treatment of animals. Singer began his response by stating that although he and Nussbaum are "allies on the most important practical question," he is compelled disagree with several points on which Nussbaum bases her argument. I find myself in a position similar to Singer's. I agree with the general point that Nussbaum makes, but I share two of Singer's criticisms: that Nussbaum oversimplifies complex theories and demonstrates a lack of concern for empirical evidence.
I agree that reductionism is detrimental to the understanding of human emotion, as Nussbaum states at the beginning of her chapter on the Decline of Reductionist Theories of Emotion (93). Nussbaum believes such theories to have “ignored, or even denied, the role of the creature’s own interpretations of the world” (93). Indeed, some theories have paid little attention to the important role of an individual’s perception in the experience of emotion. Panic disorders are an excellent example of the impact an individual’s perception can have on their emotional response to stimuli. For instance, if I were to unexpectedly encounter a spider, I would simply brush the creature aside and continue with my day. On the other hand, if an individual with a panic disorder encountered the same spider, and spiders were the focus of the individual’s phobia, this person would likely experience a strong emotional reaction of terror and dread. What accounts for this difference in reaction is the difference in our interpretations of the same event. I interpreted the encounter as harmless, seeing the spider as little more than a nuisance. The person afflicted by an arachnophobia, on the other hand, saw the spider as threatening, and acted accordingly. Without accounting for variances in perception, the individuals response to the spider would be baffling—not to mention untreatable.
However, my agreement with Nussbaum ends with the overarching argument she makes. I consider many of Nussbaum’s arguments to rely on an oversimplification of various theoretical approaches, and selective citations of research findings. One area where this tendency was especially salient was in Nussbaum's discussion of “physiological reductionists,” those individuals who hoped that if emotion could not be “eliminated in favor of stimulus-response explanations, it might at last be reduced to some relatively simple physiological response that could be studied without concern for the creature’s own interpretations” (96). One reason I consider this to be an oversimplification is that the results of physiological assessments are often compared to subjective self-reports, which detail the participants subjective interpretation of the particular emotion and the intensity with which it was experienced. In my experience with such research, the goal was to learn about the relationship between physiological responses and subjective experience of emotions; not to define the subjective experience by the physiological response.
Furthermore, Nussbaum failed to account for the many situations in which such research is largely beneficial to the identification and treatment of disorders. For example, if a young man were to present at a sexual health clinic with complaints of erectile dysfunction, it would be important to identify whether the problem was physiological (and should be referred to a cardiovascular specialist) or psychological (and should be referred to a therapist). Using the same penile-strain-gauge technique that Nussbaum describes as “bizarrely comical” (99), something can be learned about the underlying cause (whether emotional or physical) of this patient’s complaint.
Nussbaum further objects that one would not want to “grant that a person with an injury that makes erection impossible is incapable of arousal” (100). This argument seems true enough on the surface, but she fails to provide an example of any psychological researcher who has come to this conclusion. This is unsurprising, however, since it is unlikely that anyone has ever suggested it.
It seems, in many cases, that Nussbaum takes a rather “reductionist” view herself; the same style of thinking she is arguing against. Rather than approaching various research focuses as just that—research focuses, Nussbaum reduces them to reductionist views. She even alludes to religion, claiming at one point to be “agnostic” (102). The field of psychology has long forsaken such simplified views and now embraces a “multi-dimensional” or “integrative” approach. Researchers David Barlow and Mark Durand offer a clear and concise definition of the integrative approach, calling it one that weaves “scientific findings from the study of emotions together with behavioral, biological, cognitive, and social discoveries to create an integrated tapestry of psychopathology” (xv). However, note that it is the one-dimensional view that has been forsaken, not the content each research focus contributes to the larger understanding of the human experience. Nussbaum seems to argue against any view that does not match her own by attacking the content—which could just as easily (and perhaps more realistically) be incorporated into a more comprehensive argument for the virtues of including individual interpretation in our understanding of emotion.
Lastly, although I agree with Nussbaum's general idea, I found her apparent lack of respect for empirical evidence to be concerning. Nussbaum states that her account of emotions “need not be unscientific or indifferent to scientific evidence” (92), yet the remainder of her argument seems to suggest otherwise. Nussbaum wonders why scientists have refused to “let their own insights as ‘human beings’ influence the science they did,” noting that they often rely on participants’ subjective reports (98). Where scientific research is the goal, allowing your ‘own insights’ to influence a study is a serious faux pas. This is the precise reason that single- and double-blind experiments have been designed. Nussbaum then seems to contradict her statement of distaste for subjective participant ratings, saying that “although we inevitably lack the first-person reports in the animal case, we can come as close to that as possible by focusing on a detailed narrative account of the emotions of particular animals, made by an observer who has unusual empathy and unusual awareness of the specific capacities of the animal in question.” Aside from contradicting an earlier statement, this sentence suggests a style of investigation that could hardly be called scientific.
Barlow, David H., and V. Mark Durand. Abnormal Psychology: An Integrative Approach. Ed. James Perkins, et al. 6th ed. Belmont: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009. Print.
Singer, Peter. A Response to Martha Nussbaum. Utilitarian Philosophers. http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/20021113.htm
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