Brennan: The Transmission of Affect (5-7)

          Brennan evokes many religious images in this section of her book. She discusses the relationship between affect and sin, noting that the seven deadly sins--pride, sloth, envy, lust, anger, glutton, and avarice--are not sins or actions, but rather affects (98-99). They are detestable, she says, "because of the affective constellations they embody" (99). As affect is transferable, we deplore these sins not only in ourselves, but also in others; we fear that we may be subject to the "objectifying and 'abject-ifying' images" these powerfully negative affects impose (99). Accordingly, Brennan conceptualizes affect as demons that are tied to such sins and, of course, "capable of moving from one person to another" (115).
          She paints a picture “free-flowing guilt” and “free-floating anxiety” hovering ghoul-like over our heads, searching for their next susceptible host (97). She believes that the frequency of such transfers escalates in conditions where anxiety is heightened, naming specifically “modern toxic environments” (114). In light of this fact, it should be all the more alarming that we, though once aware of this transmission, have suppressed all knowledge of the phenomenon. Interestingly, it is this same modern environment that is cited as responsible for our obliviousness to the entire situation. Apparently, we have fooled ourselves into believing that our “demons” and “affects” are actually our “egos” when our egos are actually “nothing more than a constellation of affects” (117). Aside from a proliferation of the foundational fantasy, the effects of our ego-affects can be seen in the dwindling nature of our religious institutions and social niceties. She believes that religion and social standards empower us to recognize and resist becoming the transmission of the negative affect of others (123). But now that we lack this protection, we are led astray by the notion that we should be free to express our emotions. But according to Brennan, our feelings can be dangerous. She observes that powerful emotion often serves as its own form of rationality, citing Aristotle’s belief that “the doer of evil doe snot know at the time that he is doing evil” (118).
          To be honest, I find it exceptionally difficult to say whether I agree with Brennan or not. There seems to be a sort of sense to what she’s writing, but not one that appeals to my style of logical reasoning. Similarly, she seems to be incredibly well-informed on the subject of emotions, but perhaps doesn’t cite frequently enough the sources that would most easily win my support. I think, for now, my position is one of cautious inclusion, incorporating a few of her ideas into my own framework of emotion and appreciating her unique perspective. I do not believe, however, that I will be abandoning entire “foundational fantasy”, though. Like Aristotle, I see much virtue in means. I rarely value one extreme over another, preferring a cafeteria-like approach to most philosophical matters.